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EMOTIONS, VALUES, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RISK
Susan A. Bandes †
In response to Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk
Regulation, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (2008).
Are emotions subversive of reason or essential constituents
of it?

This is the broad question posed by Dan Kahan in Two

Concepts of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 1 a welcome addition to
his ongoing inquiry into how emotional appraisals of value
influence decision making.

Much of Kahan’s recent work has

focused on a particular aspect of policymaking:
risk perception.

the study of

Two Conceptions continues a useful exchange

between Kahan and Cass Sunstein 2 about the differences between

†

Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul University College of

Law; Visiting Professor, University of Chicago Law School, 20072008.

I am indebted to Andy Koppelman, Carol Sanger, Stephen

Siegel, and Cass Sunstein for their insightful comments, and to
Robert Brooks and Laura DeMichael, of the University of Chicago
Law School Class of 2009, for their excellent research
assistance.
1

Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation,

156 U. Pa. L. Rev 741 (2008).
2

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear:

Beyond the

Precautionary Principle (2005) [hereinafter Sunstein, Laws of
1

their prominent approaches to risk regulation:

Kahan’s cultural

cognition approach 3 and Sunstein’s heuristics and biases
approach, which focuses on the cognitive mechanisms that shape
perceptions about risk. 4

Kahan illuminates the issues at stake

with his customary passion and clarity.

Fear].

The other principal texts of the Kahan/Sunstein

interchange are Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy:

A

Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1071
(2006) (reviewing Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra), and Cass R.
Sunstein, Misfearing:

A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110 (2006)

[hereinafter Sunstein, Misfearing] (replying to Kahan et al.,
supra).
3

See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and

Public Policy, 24 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 149 (2006); Kahan et al.,
supra note 2, at 1072.
4

According to Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel

Kahneman, “The core idea of the heuristics and biases program is
that judgment under uncertainty is often based on a limited
number of simplifying heuristics rather than more formal and
extensive algorithmic processing.”
Preface to Heuristics and Biases:

Thomas Gilovich et al.,
The Psychology of Intuitive

Judgment, at xv, xv (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)
[hereinafter Heuristics and Biases].
2

A major contribution of Kahan’s work has been its insight
into the pervasiveness of emotional influences on the decisionmaking process.

The recognition that emotion pervades decision

making raises a difficult normative question:

how to

distinguish the influences that contribute to good judgment from
those that distort judgment.

This normative question in turn

gives rise to a difficult practical question:
the influences that cause distortion.

how to address

In this brief Response, I

argue that tackling this evaluative task requires avoiding
mirror impulses:

emotions should neither be privileged as

inherently desirable nor marginalized as inherently irrational.
They should be judged based on what they contribute to the
cognitive task at hand.
The task at hand, as the Kahan/Sunstein debate defines it,
is determining how government should regulate risk.

In

exploring the question of how this task is best approached, I
will also raise a question about how it is defined.

I suggest

that the very act of framing issues of government policy in
terms of risk regulation reflects certain assumptions about how
issues present themselves and what sorts of cognitive processes
might be required to address them.
I.

Cognitive Process:

Distinguishing the Mechanism from

the Interfering Factors

3

Dan Kahan’s important message is that emotion operates at a
much more basic and pervasive level than is commonly thought.
share this view. 5

I

Although emotions are often portrayed as

bursts of feeling that intrude upon rational thought from time
to time, this view is out of step with current findings across a
range of disciplines.

Current theorists tend to view emotions

as processes rather than fixed states--as pervasive influences
on the way we appraise and react to stimuli. 6

In this account,

emotions help us to interpret, organize, and prioritize the
information that bombards us.

We categorize this information

based on assumptions about what is to be feared, who is to be
trusted, and who is within our circle of care and compassion.
We organize it into a coherent account of human behavior and

5

Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to The Passions of Law 1, 1-2

(Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
6

There is no single overarching definition of emotion.

As the

philosopher Robert Solomon observed, “‘Emotion’ is a
heterogeneous category that encompasses a wide variety of
significant psychological phenomena.”

Robert C. Solomon, What

Is an Emotion?, Emotion Researcher (Int’l Soc’y for Res. on
Emotion, Poughkeepsie, N.Y.), Spring 2007, at 5.
4

causality. 7

We cannot function without creating markers of

saliency and value, and our emotions aid us in identifying which
information is especially salient, 8 valuable, or urgent--or
indeed, worthy of notice or action at all. 9

In short, emotions

help shape the heuristic and other cognitive tools that are
essential to the continuing task of information processing. 10

7

See, e.g., Joseph P. Forgas et al., Responding to the Social

World:

Explicit and Implicit Processes in Social Judgments, in

Social Judgments:

Implicit and Explicit Processes 1, 7-8

(Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Social
Judgments]) (discussing various theories about the dynamics of
social judgment).
8

For a discussion of recent neuroscientific studies of how the

brain selectively processes portions of its inputs based on
measures of saliency, see Shih-Cheng Yen & Leif H. Finkel,
Salience, in 4 Encyclopedia of the Human Brain 237 (V.S.
Ramachandran ed., 2002).
9

See Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error:

Emotion, Reason, and

the Human Brain 173-75 (1994) (describing the “somatic marker”
theory, one influential explanation of how the brain highlights
and prioritizes information).
10

See, e.g., Joseph P. Forgas & Rebekah East, Affective

Influences on Social Judgments and Decisions:
5

Implicit and

These devices may steer us wrong, or they may transmute into
biases, but they are an essential part of our cognitive
apparatus.
Whether a cognitive tool steers us wrong depends on the
purpose it is meant to serve.

For example, in much simpler

times, fear of strangers or tribal loyalty might have been
adequate ways of defining who we should avoid or who we should
trust.

Such heuristics in a complex, heterogeneous world easily

transmute into unhelpful and even pernicious biases.

Thus, in

order to consider what role individual emotions--and the
judgments they help shape--ought to play in governmental
policymaking, 11 we need a normative theory of how government

Explicit Processes, in Social Judgments, supra note 7, at 198221.
11

As Kahan and Sunstein both recognize, the question of how

people would address risk individually differs from the question
of how they would like their government to address collective
risks.

The latter question is the relevant one for the topic at

hand.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 261

(1997) (distinguishing the preferences people hold as private
consumers from their collective political judgments); and Kahan
et al., supra note 2, at 1106 (raising ambiguity between
6

ought to govern and what role individual citizens ought to play
in governance.
Kahan and Sunstein are in substantial agreement that the
ultimate goal is a deliberative democracy that advances the
ideals of transparency, autonomy, and robust debate among those
with diverse perspectives; enables the conditions for informed
choice; and respects the considered values of the citizenry. 12
Their disagreements center on determining how those values
should be evaluated and what weight they should be accorded in
the formation of policy.

More specifically, Kahan and Sunstein

part company on how laypeople understand and weigh risks, and on
the deference government should accord their perceptions.

I

will consider the implications of both scholars’ conceptions of
emotion for the questions at hand.
II.

Emotion, Value, Belief

Dan Kahan has long argued that emotion plays an important
role in the way people arrive at their beliefs 13 (for example,

measures of individual preferences and individual visions of a
good society).
12

See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 11, at 13-14; Kahan et al.,

supra note 2, at 1072.
13

The definitional issues posed by interdisciplinary discourse

on these issues are daunting.

Many of the relevant terms
7

their positions on gun control, capital punishment, or
abortion).

He argues as a normative matter that emotions

reflect values, that governmental policy should to some extent
reflect the values of the citizenry, and that therefore the
emotions of individuals are entitled to some weight in
policymaking.

He argues, as a practical matter, that in order

to communicate with and perhaps even persuade people of

describing feeling, attitude, and belief have no accepted
meaning, are used interchangeably, or have contested meanings.
See, e.g., Bertram Gawronski, Editorial:
Measured!
(2007).

Attitudes Can Be

But What Is an Attitude?, 25 Soc. Cognition 573, 574

The terms “emotion” and “affect” are sometimes used

interchangeably and sometimes to connote different concepts.
Neither has a single accepted meaning.
use them interchangeably.

In this Response, I will

As to the term “values,” Kahan tends

to use this term, like the phrase “cultural worldview,” to
connote a general orientation, such as an egalitarian or
individualistic ethic.
at 150.

See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, supra note 3,

But cf. Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 2, at 1112.

The meaning of the term “values” will be a central focus of this
Response.

As to the term “beliefs,” Kahan uses it to describe

positions on issues, such as gun control and the death penalty.
Kahan & Braman, supra note 3, at 150.
8

disparate beliefs, it is necessary to address the emotions that
animate those beliefs. 14
Like Kahan, I believe that emotional influences cannot be
easily cabined; and, moreover, that while they do not always
help produce the optimal answer, they cannot be dismissed as
mere impediments to fruitful thought.

As a practical matter, it

also follows, as Kahan argues, that if we want to channel or
regulate emotions, we first must acknowledge them.

In Antonio

Damasio’s words, “taking stock of the pervasive role of feelings
may give us a chance of enhancing their positive effects and
reducing their potential harm.” 15
But Kahan’s claim that values reflect emotions and are
therefore entitled to normative weight bears further scrutiny.
Emotion is an integral part of normative judgment, but emotions
are not entitled to a priori normative weight in determining the
shape of policy.

Kahan’s work sheds much light on the social

dynamics of belief formation, but it tends to treat values as
inherently good rather than interrogating their content or their
susceptibility to change.

He views emotion “as a perceptive

faculty uniquely suited to discerning what stance toward risk

14

Kahan, supra note 1, at 761-66.

15

Damasio, supra note 9, at 246.
9

best coheres with a person’s values.” 16

The values (or cultural

worldviews) themselves, in this account, are stable and
reflective, rather than context sensitive.

They are trait-like

attributes, 17 like an “egalitarian” ethic or “individualistic”
values. 18
I suggest that value and fact have a more fluid and
mutually constitutive relationship.

We construct the world in

light of assumptions about how it ought to work, but what we
perceive helps shape what we feel and what we value.

Neither

emotion nor value is inert; both shape and are shaped by social
milieu.

For example, the ongoing national debate in the wake of

the September 11 terrorist attacks has caused many people to
reevaluate not just their beliefs about issues like racial
profiling and torture, but also their underlying values about
the balance between civil liberty and security.

Our fears may

influence us to condone indefinite detention or harsh
interrogation; our capacity for empathy and compassion might

16

Kahan, supra note 1, at 744.

17

Of course, for purposes of empirical research, any proxy for

difficult-to-measure attributes like “values” or “attitudes”
will involve some tradeoffs between complexity and workability.
18

See, e.g., Kahan & Braman, supra note 3, at 153-54 (discussing

work by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky).
10

lead us to be concerned about the fate of those detained or
outraged about our government’s role in the abuse of prisoners.
People interpret factual data in light of their values; but
ideally their values also evolve in response to understandings
of the data that emerge as part of the social process of
deliberation. 19
III.

The Challenges of Empirical and Normative Complexity

Cass Sunstein’s risk regulation scholarship is centrally
concerned with evaluating perceptions of risk and the weight
those perceptions should be accorded in policymaking.

His work

within the field of heuristics and biases has made a major
contribution to our understanding of the challenges posed by the
vast gap between information about risk and the individual’s
ability to process it.

As Sunstein’s scholarship amply

demonstrates, people often fear things that are not particularly
likely to happen and minimize much more likely hazards.

They

may fear nuclear power and embrace sunbathing, without paying

19

See generally Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund, Social

Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Moral Psychology, in 2
Moral Psychology (W. Sinnott-Armstrong ed.) (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=855164 (arguing that moral
judgment is a social process).
11

careful attention to the actual risks posed by either one. 20
Although Sunstein’s work tends to focus on fear, 21 this
point can be made regarding other emotions and emotional
capacities as well.

For example, empathy may also drive people

to take measures that seem disproportionate to the harm caused.
It has been twenty years since the toddler Jessica McClure fell
into a well in her backyard and was trapped there for fiftyeight hours.

The nation was transfixed by the rescue effort and

an outpouring of support followed; there are reports that on her
twenty-fifth birthday McClure will come into a million dollar
trust fund contributed by “well-wishers.” 22

Also in 1987,

however, one thousand people died in an earthquake in Ecuador--

20

Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, at 86.

21

And more recently, indignation.

& Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation:

See generally Daniel Kahneman
Psychology, Politics, Law

(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper
No. 346, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1002707.
22

David Randall, From Girl Trapped in a Well to Millionaire:

The Remarkable Jessica McClure, Independent, Oct. 14, 2007,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/from-girltrapped-in-a-well-to-millionaire-the-remarkable-jessica-mcclure396850.html.
12

an event that elicited far less attention and emotion in the
United States at the time and is likely less remembered today
than the McClure incident.
Empathy is an essential capacity for social beings, 23 and an
essential part of effective moral judgment--the kind that leads
us to be concerned not only about a little girl in Texas, but
also about the loss of life in countries far away.

By itself,

empathy provides no metric for making difficult allocational
decisions 24 --and it may pull us in directions that do not reflect
our best collective judgment. 25

23

Thus it is certainly right that

See Sandra Blakeslee, Cells That Read Minds, N.Y. Times, Jan.

10, 2006, at F1 (discussing the discovery of “mirror neurons,”
which allow us to understand the “actions, intentions and
emotions of others . . . [b]y feeling, not by thinking”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
24

See Susan A. Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact

Statements, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361, 379-82 (1996) (arguing that
empathy is a capacity that does not necessarily lead to
normatively desirable actions).
25

See, e.g., EurekAlert, How Do We Stop Genocide When We Begin

To Lose Interest After the First Victim? (Feb. 15, 2007),
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2007-02/uoo-hdw021207.php
13

government should not simply reflect individual fears and
empathies; that it needs expert advice; that its role is to take
a broader view of the common welfare; and that sometimes it
needs to model and encourage values, not merely reflect them.
Nevertheless, although empathy cannot provide a metric, it is
one of a range of emotions that are always part of the calculus.
There is no “correct” metric for governmental obligation, and
there exists no rational calculus uninfluenced by loyalty,
compassion, and affect-based judgments of need and desert.
Government policy should not simply reflect emotion, but
emotion per se is not the problem.

The challenge is to

encourage the helpful emotions, and discourage, educate, or
cabin the unhelpful ones.

Sunstein believes that individual

values should carry some weight in government policy.

However,

he assumes a clearly discernible line between values and facts
and argues that mistakes of fact are entitled to no deference. 26
He suggests that one solution to the prevalent problems of
factual error is to delegate certain risk regulation issues to
experts.

As Kahan persuasively argues, values and facts are not

easily disentangled--by either ordinary citizens or experts.

(reporting on Paul Slovic’s study of moral intuition and its
limitations in motivating responses to genocide).
26

See Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 2, at 1123-25.
14

Therefore it is not easy--and not necessarily desirable--to give
weight to judgments about the former and not the latter.

This

debate about the value/fact distinction is critical to the
question of risk regulation.
IV.

Judgments of Value and Judgments of Fact

The heuristics and biases model on which Sunstein relies
regards heuristics as a compromise--a substitute (albeit one
that usually works quite well) for a more deliberative,
accurate, and reliable reasoning process.

If this view is

correct, it makes sense to be very cautious about according
normative weight to beliefs that are the product of--or are
unduly influenced by--these substitute processes and to prefer
the conclusions reached by those with more time and better
information.

However, this view appears to derive from the

heuristics and biases model’s origins as a corrective to (not a
challenge to) the rational actor model of economic behavior, 27
and has mainly been tested in situations requiring judgments
about quantifiable, measurable phenomena--such as judgments that

27

See Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction--Heuristics

and Biases:

Then and Now, in Heuristics and Biases, supra note

4, at 1-3 (offering a historical overview).
15

rely solely on a calculation of probabilities. 28

But current

heuristics and biases scholarship has moved beyond the study of
computational processes to address questions about governmental
policy that are both empirically and normatively complex 29 and
that have no definitive, value-neutral answers.

Distinguishing

helpful heuristics from unhelpful biases requires examining
particular emotional influences on particular judgmental tasks
and making a normative decision about whether they advance or
distort judgment.

28

These evaluations may differ depending on

See id. at 17 (referring to the “computations of similarity

and availability that were the basis of the original research in
this tradition”).

See also the summaries of research in Steven

A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning, in Heuristics and Biases,
supra note 4, at 379-96, and Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F.
West, Individual Differences in Reasoning:

Implications for the

Rationality Debate?, in Heuristics and Biases, supra note 4, at
421-40.
29

See Forgas et al., supra note 7, at 9-10 (“[J]udgmental

heuristics or shortcuts do serve a functional purpose, even if
their operation can sometimes produce normatively questionable
outcomes, especially in . . . highly manipulated and
impoverished experimental situations . . . .”).
16

whether the reasoning is purely computational or involves more
complex social judgments. 30
Although Sunstein and other scholars writing about these
issues address the role of values and other factors complicating
the rational actor model, the heuristics and biases model on
which they rely still regards affect-free rationality as the
normative baseline and emotion-influenced judgments as products

30

Current research suggests that emotions may play a far smaller

role in arriving at “[j]udgments that do not rely on memorybased information,” and instead rely on “abstract and
uninvolving stimulus materials, such as the word lists typically
preferred by cognitive researchers.”

Emotions play a larger

role in constructive judgment situations that require “active
elaboration and transformation of the available stimulus
information.”

Forgas & East, supra note 10, at 204; see also

William D. Casebeer & Patricia S. Churchland, The Neural
Mechanisms of Moral Cognition:

A Multiple-Aspect Approach to

Moral Judgment and Decision-Making, 18 Biology & Phil. 169, 188
(2003) (“Moral judgments tell us what we ought to think so that
we know what to do.

Isolating the doing from the knowing via an

artificial experimental regimen can remove the directedness of
moral cognition.”).
17

of normative bias. 31

As Kahan describes, in this model, affect

is treated as a heuristic rather than a general property of
cognition 32 --at best a shortcut to rational judgment, at worst an
interference with it. 33

This baseline assumption is problematic.

It approaches emotion as a suspect category, rather than
assessing particular emotions and their suitability in context.
Current research on emotion and cognition supports a very
different view.

It views emotion as a source of information in

its own right; not just a second-best substitute for
deliberation.

Emotion gives rise to irrationality in some

circumstances but performs an important role in others.

For

social and moral judgment, it is an essential source of
information--one that enables us to perceive and attend to the
emotions of others and to predict the consequences of our
actions for others. 34

Damasio and other researchers have

31

See, e.g., Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 2, at 1119.

32

See Kahan, supra note 1, at 743; Paul Slovic et al., The

Affect Heuristic, in Heuristics and Biases, supra note 4, at
397-420.
33

See, e.g., Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 2, at 1119 n.42.

34

See, e.g., William D. Casebeer, Moral Cognition and Its Neural

Constituents, 4 Nature Reviews:

Neuroscience 841, 843-44 (2003)
18

observed that subjects with impaired access to their emotions
may lose the ability to make decisions beneficial to their wellbeing or the welfare of others. 35

In addition, emotion helps us

determine what we value, and what requires our immediate
attention.

For example, Damasio’s impaired subjects often

gather information obsessively, performing endless cost-benefit
analyses, but lose the ability to decide between options. 36

Both

information and affect are essential to judgment.
Second, current emotion research views emotion as shaping
perceptions of fact as well as perceptions of value, and as
influencing deliberative as well as intuitive reasoning.

The

initial factual assumptions underlying intuitive processing
continue to exert a strong influence on the more deliberative

(discussing “theory of mind” as an essential component of moral
reasoning).
35

See Damasio, supra note 9, at 36-37 (discussing Elliot, a

patient with damage to his prefrontal cortex).

As Damasio

points out, the particular pathology will depend on the nature
of the neurological damage at issue.
36

Id. at 38-39.

See id. at 193 (discussing another patient with damage to his

prefrontal cortex).
19

processing that follows. 37

For example, as I have argued

elsewhere, the empirical debate about whether the death penalty
deters crime is unlikely to be resolved no matter how many facts
are amassed. 38

Proponents and opponents begin from different

assumptions about human behavior.

These assumptions influence

not only their value judgments about what tradeoffs are
acceptable but their factual assumptions about how many crimes
might be deterred.

Unless they come to question their initial

assumptions--something people rarely do of their own accord--the
deliberation that follows will simply build upon and reinforce
those initial assumptions. 39
This dynamic has implications for the question of experts
that divides Kahan and Sunstein.

If the intuitive process leads

to errors and distortions, deliberation will not correct these

37

Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of

Retributive Justice, 41 Advances Experimental Soc. Psychol.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 40-42), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031193.
38

See generally Susan Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons:

Examining the Strange Persistence of the American Death Penalty,
42 Stud. L., Pol. & Soc’y (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 1618), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019615.
39

Id.
20

errors unless they are brought into consciousness 40 --and this is
true for experts as well as laypeople. 41

40

Conversely, the intuitive process is more educable than this

model assumes.
Thin Blue Line:

See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., Across the
Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision

To Shoot, 92 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1006, 1007-08 (2007)
(reporting on the effectiveness of training for eliminating
racially based aspects of police officers’ split-second
decisions to shoot).
41

See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Lessons of Capturing the

Friedmans:

Moral Panic, Institutional Denial and Due Process, 3

Law, Culture & Human. 293, 302 (2007) (discussing, inter alia,
the role of child psychology and child abuse experts in
fomenting moral panic about daycare sexual abuse and satanic
worship).

For an example of a successful effort to counteract

bias by bringing it into consciousness, see Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?
(Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n 17th Annual Meeting, Working Paper No.
67, 2007), available at
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/lawpoliticswkshprachlinski.pdf (measuring race and gender bias among trial
judges and finding that once it is brought into consciousness,
it can be ameliorated).
21

V.

The Construction of Risk

Determining what constitutes a risk is not a mechanical
calculus.

It is a task of identification and definition that

requires deciding what questions to ask, what temporal and
causal links to draw, 42 what assumptions about “social” or
“natural” forces to make, and how to fit the answers into a
coherent narrative amenable to policy recommendations.

In

short, identifying and delineating risks implicates a cognitive
process that is both normative and affect laden.
In a groundbreaking book on the Chicago heat wave of 1995,
sociologist Eric Klinenberg illustrates both the crucial
importance and the limitations of factfinding. 43

Klinenberg’s

“social autopsy” of the Chicago heat wave examines the 739 heatrelated deaths 44 that occurred during a six-day period in
Chicago, and analyzes the factors that made it so difficult for

42

See, e.g., Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Kevin N. Dunbar, A

Cognitive Neuroscience Framework for Understanding Causal
Reasoning and the Law, 359 Phil. Transactions Royal Soc. London
B 1749, 1751-52 (2004).
43

Eric Klinenberg, Heat Wave:

A Social Autopsy of Disaster in

Chicago (2002).
44

“Heat-related” deaths are those that would not have occurred

but for the heat.

Id. at 29-30.
22

this tragedy to be seen, first, as a unified phenomenon at all,
and second, as anything other than a natural and inevitable
disaster.

He concludes that the deaths were the result of a

complex combination of factors, most of which were man-made and
therefore susceptible to correction. 45
The account has much to say about experts and their role in
risk and disaster assessment.

One of the few heroes of

Klinenberg’s narrative is an expert:

the Cook County Medical

Examiner, who, in the face of considerable pressure, insisted on
establishing and applying the criteria that led to the
classification of the deaths as “heat related” and made possible
the identification of a pattern of “excess deaths.” 46

Yet the

most compelling message of the book is that many of the factors
that caused and defined this disaster did not fall into familiar
categories of risk or catastrophe and thus failed to register
with experts or opinion makers.

In part, this was an issue of

salience, or availability--heat waves simply don’t generate the

45

He describes the crisis and its causes as exemplifying a

“total social fact, one that integrates and activates a broad
set of social institutions and generates a series of social
processes that expose the inner workings of the city.”
32.
46

Id. at 26-27.
23

Id. at

tangible physical damage (or the spectacular, camera-ready
images) that floods, fires and hurricanes do.

But, in addition,

the social factors that contributed to the mortality rate also
contributed to the masking of the scope and nature of the
disaster.

The vast majority of the victims were poor, isolated,

and “invisible;” that is, off the radar of the general populace
and the “social scientific experts on disasters.” 47

Klinenberg

notes that
the methods and theories used in conventional health
and climate studies deprive scientists of the
instruments they need to conduct a thorough
investigation.

There is little in their professional

tool kit to help explain the social sources of the
disaster.

Although every major study and report has

found that medical and meteorological approaches are
inadequate to explain why so many Chicago residents
died, no one has analyzed how the city’s social
environment contributed to the devastation. 48
As Klinenberg argues, before an unexpected situation can be
perceived as a disaster or a risk, it needs to fit certain
frames that prompt certain types of experts to ask--or to be

47

Id. at 17.

48

Id. at 18.
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asked--the questions they are used to addressing.

In this case,

“political officials, journalists, and research scientists
established the dominant analyses of the heat wave as well as
the basic categories that organized public discourse about the
trauma.” 49

The result was that the disaster was viewed as a

naturally occurring phenomenon, perhaps exacerbated by the
individual fault of the victims’ families or even the victims
themselves.

The consequence of this construction of events was

that, for years afterward, experts and government officials saw
no need to determine how to prevent such a disaster from
happening again.
Even as to more easily recognizable disasters and
tragedies, affect-laden assumptions about human behavior and
causality affect risk assessment.
response to Hurricane Katrina.

Consider, for example, the

What lessons about risk

regulation can be learned from the facts of the disaster?
First, we need to decide what in fact went wrong, and what facts
are relevant to preventing another disaster.

To some, Katrina

was a natural disaster, or at least a natural disaster in a
place that is below sea level and therefore never should have
been settled.

For others, it was a product of humanly

exacerbated global warming, or of negligence by the Corps of

49

Id. at 23.
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Engineers, perhaps compounded by various other forms of
government ineptitude.
racism.

Some saw not generalized ineptitude but

Others saw an aggregation of poor choices by

individuals--such as building shoddy homes on low ground or
failing to implement an exit plan.

There are numerous factual

issues that are susceptible to measurement imbedded in these
perceptions.
Nevertheless, the larger questions of what caused the
disaster and how best to prevent the next one require complex
judgments of fact and value.

Causation is never solely a

factual calculation--it always requires a standard of proof, a
decision about the relevance of motive, fault, or
blameworthiness, and a way of comparing contributory factors.
Any discussion of solutions will be influenced, in part, by
evaluative assumptions and biases about who is deserving of aid,
what is fixable and what is inevitable, which factors are most
relevant, and who is within our circle of empathy and
compassion.
As Klinenberg’s study illustrates, experts as well as
laypeople will gather and evaluate data in light of implicit
assumptions about how the world works.

For experts to add value

to the equation, they need more than just additional data.

They

need a means of identifying their own background assumptions and
recognizing the emotional influences that animate them, and a
26

means of splitting off the influences that interfere with sound
judgment. 50

Current research suggests that people are not very

good at identifying their own fallibilities, and that correction
is more likely to come from debate with others and exposure to
differing viewpoints than from continued private deliberation. 51
Values and the emotions that animate them should be
assessed in light of our democratic aspirations.

As political

scientist Sharon Krause argues, “the ideal of reciprocity . . .
obligates citizens to justify public decisions in terms that all
can endorse.” 52

50

“[R]ightly conceived,” this ideal “involves the

See, e.g., Joe Nocera, The Worst Investors?

Humans, N.Y.

Times, Sept. 29, 2007, at C1 (reviewing Jason Zweig, Your Money
& Your Brain (2007)) (recounting the difficulties financial
experts encounter in overriding their emotions to apply their
own principles of investing).

According to Nocera, Zweig

believes that experts who succeed in the face of crisis do not
“ignore their emotions . . .[, but rather] turn them inside out.
When they feel fear, they don’t act on it.

They examine it.

They say, what should this feeling tell me?”

Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).
51

See Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 19.

52

Sharon R. Krause, Public Deliberation, Democratic Politics,

and the Feeling of Impartiality 2 (Feb. 9, 2007) (unpublished
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communication of appropriate sentiments and an attachment to the
common, affective concerns that are constitutive of the
political order.” 53
Conclusion
Happily, our cognitive apparatus works pretty well for the
challenges and responsibilities of living in a participatory
democracy.

Although we all bring emotions, values, and beliefs

to the table, these components of judgment are shaped and
refined in a social context.

We are not particularly good at

identifying and correcting for our own assumptions and biases,
even when we have ample time and information to deliberate.

The

better approach to correcting for blind spots and biases, and to
identifying the emotions that interfere with considered
judgment, is exposure to differing viewpoints and vigorous
debate. 54

This solution jibes nicely with the requirements of a

pluralistic democratic process in which values are constantly

manuscript), available at
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/csls/lawemotion_conferen
ce/PublicDeliberation_paper.pdf.
53

Id.

54

See Carlsmith & Darley, supra note 37, at 40-41; Haidt &

Bjorklund, supra note 19.
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being challenged and shaped, and in which government strives to
reflect and influence the considered values of the populace.
Participatory democracy is both a goal and a process.

Our

form of government flourishes when its citizens are open to new
information, can talk across ideological divides, and strive to
make informed choices.

In this account, values are not static.

They are formed and continually refined in a societal context.
They help shape our societal and governmental priorities, and
these priorities, in turn, help shape our values.

As cognitive

neuroscience and related disciplines are making increasingly
clear, this process of defining and acting upon our collective
values, which is so essential to the working of participatory
democracy in a heterogeneous and open society, simply could not
take place without the ability to recognize and evaluate
emotion.
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